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“You pays your money and you takes your choice.”
— Mark Twain, Huckleberry Finn
Abstract
We consider dynamic pricing schemes in online settings
where selfish agents generate online events. Previous
work on online mechanisms has dealt almost entirely with
the goal of maximizing social welfare or revenue in an
auction settings. This paper deals with quite general set-
tings and minimizing social costs. We show that appro-
priately computed posted prices allow one to achieve es-
sentially the same performance as the best online algo-
rithm. This holds in a wide variety of settings. Unlike on-
line algorithms that learn about the event, and then make
enforceable decisions, prices are posted without knowing
the future events or even the current event, and are thus
inherently dominant strategy incentive compatible.
In particular we show that one can give efficient
posted price mechanisms for metrical task systems, some
instances of the k-server problem, and metrical matching
problems. We give both deterministic and randomized
algorithms. Such posted price mechanisms decrease the
social cost dramatically over selfish behavior where no
decision incurs a charge. One alluring application of this
is reducing the social cost of free parking exponentially.
1 Introduction
We consider scenarios where agents arrive and make
decisions which influence the global environment. One
such setting is that of online auctions, where goods or
combinations of goods are sold over time. In this paper we
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Center.
†Partially supported by the Foundation for Polish Science (FNP)
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consider a more general setting that captures more general
online social choice issues.
We suggest using dynamic posted prices that dynam-
ically assign a surcharge to every decision. Under the as-
sumption that agents are rational, this allows one to prove
approximation bounds with respect to optimal target func-
tion.
The competitive analysis of online algorithms typi-
cally deals with problems cast as follows:
• A sequence of events σ1,σ2, . . . occurs over time.
• Subsequent to observing event σi, a centralized on-
line algorithm takes some decision si ∈ Si, where Si
is the set of possible decisions that can be taken in
response to event σi.
• Centralized online algorithms choose their decisions
for event i without knowing what the future holds
so as to maximize (or minimize), some function
f (σ ,s) of the sequence of events σ = σ1, . . . ,σn and
associated decisions s = s1, . . . ,sn.
In this paper we reinterpret the framework above by
having strategic agents initiate events. So rather than an
online sequence of events we have an online sequence
of strategic agents,and rather than a centralized online
algorithms making decisions the strategic agents make the
decisions themselves.
The ith agent, has some (private) type ti ∈ Ti. Con-
ditioned upon previous events σ1, . . . ,σi−1, and previous
decisions s1 ∈ S1, . . . ,si−1 ∈ Si−1, an agent type t ∈ Ti is a
function t : Si 7→ R. An agent of type t ∈ Ti has value t(s)
for decisions s ∈ Si. Ergo, a rational agent i will choose
decision
si ∈ argmax
s∈Si
ti(s).
We remark that t may take either positive or negative
values. In the translation of online problems to the
strategic setting, costs translate to negative value, benefits
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translate to positive values. Note that the target function
f remains as defined in the non-strategic online setting.
To motivate these strategic agents to “do the right
thing” (from the perspective of the designer), we intro-
duce dynamic posted pricing schemes that set a surcharge
on the set of possible decisions. A dynamic posted pricing
scheme P generates a sequence of functions 〈P1,P2, . . .〉.
Dynamic posted pricing schemes determine the i’th func-
tion, Pi, before event σi arrives.
The function Pi : Si 7→ R sets posted prices (a sur-
charge) for every possible decision in Si. We assume
quasilinearity, i.e., the utility of agent i of type t ∈ Ti —
should she decide upon s ∈ Si — is
ui(s) = t(s)−Pi(s).
Rational agents always seek to maximize their utility, or
minimize their disutility which is the negation of their
utility.
Dynamic posted prices of particular interest are vary-
ing tolls on express lanes and the SFPark system (SF-
park.org) which sets parking prices in San Francisco as
a function of parking congestion [22, 6]. Interestingly,
our dynamic posted pricing scheme for metric matching
on the line described below can be viewed as a refinement
of the SFPark system.
A very simple example for dynamic pricing, where
prices are set once and for all (all Pi’s are the same), is
the problem of online matching on unweighted bipartite
graphs[13]. In this problem, there is a stationary right
side, vertices (agents) on the left arrive online along with
edges to all adjacent vertices on the right. The target is to
maximize the number of matches made.
The KVV algorithm [13] performs a random permu-
tation of the vertices on the right and assigns an incoming
vertex to the first available vertex on the right. Translat-
ing this into the strategic agent setting, agent types give
a utility of one for a match with one of the adjacent ver-
tices. Strategic agents can be induced to emulate the KVV
algorithm by a pricing scheme assigning a surcharge of
ε,2ε, . . . to the vertices on the right in some random or-
der. Note that the surcharge for a vertex never changes so
there is no “dynamic” aspect to this pricing scheme.
Posted prices are inherently a dominant strategy in-
centive compatible mechanism. Given a dynamic posted
pricing scheme P that produces functions 〈P1,P2, . . .〉, and
a sequence of agent types t = t1, t2, . . . , tn, the set of deci-
sion sequences in equilibria is
eq(P, t) =
{
s
∣∣∣∣∣s = s1, . . . ,sn, si ∈ argmaxs∈Si ui(s)
}
.
Because of ties it may be that |eq(P, t)|> 1.
In the context of mechanism design it is often as-
sumed that if a mechanism is dominant strategy truthful,
the agents may as well reveal their true type to the mech-
anism. Moreover, the revelation principle states that with-
out loss of generality, one need consider only such direct
revelation mechanisms.
In many contexts, revealing the agent type is prob-
lematic or absurd. When going to the supermarket one
may observe what people are buying, it is hardly plausi-
ble to interview customers at length as to what their true
preferences are. Moreover, revealing the true agent type
may be a grave breach of privacy, see [20].
One could, in principle, combine a dynamic posted
pricing scheme yet insist that the agents reveal their true
type. Were we to allow this, the functions Pi could depend
on the true types of previous agents: t1, . . . , ti−1, and
on previous decisions taken by these agents: s1, . . . ,si−1
(may be relevant if agents use randomization).
To avoid the unnatural aspects of type revelation, we
like to restrict the information available to the dynamic
pricing scheme. This should be information that is (rel-
atively) easy to collect by simple observation of the con-
sequence of agent decisions without having to understand
the causes for such decisions. E.g., one can observe what
customers purchase, but not what they plan to cook for
dinner or whom they are having over. We would like to
allow dynamic pricing schemes1 to observe (some) con-
sequences of decisions made by (earlier) agents, but not
necessarily allow access to the true agent types.
The less one assumes about observable history, the
more robust the concept. E.g., in the context of dynamic
posted pricing for parking, it seems reasonable to place
sensors at parking spaces so as to as to learn what parking
spaces are free but it seems much less plausible to require
a host of miniaturized spy drones to follow everyone about
(so as to learn the true agent type — her true destination).
See discussion and definitions in Section 6.
In the context of strategic agents, we use the term
price of anarchy [17] instead of the term competitive ratio.
I.e., under the assumption that agents are rational, the
price of anarchy is the ratio between the value of the
target function f when making the best possible decisions
and the value of f when decisions are the worst case
equilibria.
We distinguish between benefit problems, where the
goal is to maximize f , and cost problems where the
goal is to minimize f . In particular, social welfare
maximization is to maximize the function ∑|σ |i=1 ti(si), and
social cost minimization is to minimize the social cost
function −∑|σ |i=1 ti(si). Clearly the goals are equivalent.
Given a dynamic pricing scheme P, target function f ,
the price of anarchy (for benefit problems) is
(1.1) min
σ ,s∈eq(P,σ)
f (σ ,s)
f (σ ,opt(σ))
,
1Or mechanisms in general.
where
opt(σ) ∈ argmax
s:si∈Si for all i
f (σ ,s).
Given a dynamic pricing scheme P, and target func-
tion f , the price of anarchy (for cost problems) is
(1.2) max
σ ,s∈eq(P,σ)
f (σ ,s)
f (σ ,opt(σ))
,
where
opt(σ) ∈ argmin
s:si∈Si for all i
f (σ ,s).
It is common to consider the competitive ratio in
terms of an adversary, and one can do the same in the
context of the price of anarchy. With this interpretation,
one may assume that the adversary knows the true types
of the entire sequence in advance.
To clarify the differences between online algorithms,
online mechanisms, and online posted prices (a special
case of online mechanisms) the following summary may
be helpful:
1. Online algorithms: events appear and are dealt with
in a centralized fashion. It is assumed that events
are “true”. Online algorithms enforce their decisions.
There is no sense in which an event says “I don’t like
what you’ve decided in my case.”
2. Online mechanisms: events appear and decisions are
made, prizes and fees set, in a centralized fashion.
Just as with competitive algorithms, online mech-
anisms can (magically?) enforce their decisions.
There is no sense in which an event can “revolt”
against a decision that she does not like.
3. Dynamic posted pricing (this paper) sets a posted
price for every possible decision. Incoming strategic
events make their own decisions based upon their
own self interest. “You pays your money and you
makes your choice”. Moreover, different dynamic
posted pricing schemes can be compared both with
respect to the competitive ratio they achieve and with
respect to the quality of the observable history they
require.
1.1 Problems and Results We consider the following
problems
Metrical task systems [3] Metrical task systems are
described by a symmetric non-negative m× m matrix,
(dst)1≤s,t≤m, where dss = 0 and the triangle inequality
holds: dst ≤ dsk + dkt for all 1 ≤ s, t,k ≤ m. The set
S = {1, . . . ,m} is the set of states. A task is a vector of
m non negative real values,
w = (w1,w2, . . . ,wm) .
In response to the arrival of a new task, wi, a centralized
online algorithm decides upon some state s ∈ S. The cost
of a sequence of decisions s1, . . . ,sn for a sequence of
tasks w1, . . . ,wn is
∑dsi−1si +wisi .
Strategic metrical task systems The [dis]utility of an
agent is the sum of transition cost (to go from state to
state), the cost of executing the task in the state chosen,
and the surcharge for the decision taken. It is very easy
to see that, without introducing a surcharge, the price
of anarchy is unbounded. strategic agents will never
take expensive transitions. If one were to consider an
online algorithm as a mechanism without money, agents
will lie shamelessly. Every state other than their greedy
preference would cost infinity.
Here we give a dynamic posted pricing scheme with
a competitive ratio of O(m), within O(1) of the best
deterministic competitive ratio possible. The observable
history consists of the actual state transitions and the cost
to serve the tasks in the states chosen. The observable
history does not include the cost of the tasks in states that
were not chosen.
The k-server problem [19, 16, 15] The k server problem
has k servers located in some metric space. Online
requests arrive following which some server is to be
moved to the request location. I.e., one needs to decide
upon which server is to be moved. The goal is to minimize
the sum of distances traveled. A competitive ratio of k is
known for some metric spaces, whereas 2k−1 is an upper
bound for general metric spaces [16], vs. a lower bound
of k. Closing the gap for deterministic algorithms is an
infamous open problem.
The strategic k-server problem The disutility of an
agent is the distance traversed by the server. Thus, without
a dynamic posted pricing scheme, agents will always
choose the closest server to move, giving an unbounded
price of anarchy. We give a dynamic posted pricing
scheme for any metric space with 2 servers with a price of
anarchy 10. For k-servers on the line, we give the optimal
price of anarchy k. In this case, the observable history
(the server positions) allows one to infer the true type of
previous agents.
Metric Matching [14, 12] The metric matching problem
is described on some metric space. Events are points
in the metric space, who are to be matched to some
unmatched point, with the goal of minimizing the sum of
distances between the incoming points and their match.
One application of this problem is parking, where one
seeks to assign homeowners a parking spot close to their
home. The problem on the line is another infamous open
problem, conjectured to have a constant competitive ratio
in [12] but still open.
Strategic Metric Matching The disutility of an agent is
the distance between the agent destination and the point
assigned to the agent. Ergo, strategic agents will always
choose the closest possible point.
It follows from [14] that without surcharges the price
of anarchy may be exponential in the size of the metric
space.
We give a randomized dynamic posted pricing
scheme with a competitive ratio logarithmic in the ratio
between the largest and smallest distances between points.
In particular, this implies an exponential improvement in
the price of anarchy over the price of anarchy without sur-
charges. Moreover, given an estimate on the cost of the
optimal solution, we can attain a doubly exponential im-
provement over the price of anarchy without surcharges.
2 Related Work
Lavi and Nisan [18] initiated the study of online auctions.
The consider a model of indivisible goods where bidders
have a privately known valuation for different quantities
of the goods. Agents learn their valuation at some time
and must bid immediately. The auction must decide
immediately how many units to allocate and at what price.
They show that the only dominant strategy incentive
compatible mechanisms are those that offer a price menu
for different quantities.
Awerbuch, Azar, and Myerson [1] give a general
scheme that produces posted prices for general combi-
natorial auctions, with a competitive ratio equal to the
logarithm of the ratio between highest and lowest prices,
times the underlying competitive ratio for the combinato-
rial auction (which is terrible, in general).
In [7] Friedman and Parkes introduced a model of on-
line mechanism design, they seek strategyproof mecha-
nisms where agents may manipulate their arrival time and
values. They give a variant of the VCG mechanism for
some such problems. One of the issues from this paper
and subsequent work has been misrepresentation of arrival
times (or departure times, or both).
In the main, we do not consider misrepresentation
with respect to time or position in the sequence. See
discussion in Section 6
In Parkes [21] a general formalism for dynamic envi-
ronments and online mechanism design is given. In this
general model a mechanism makes (and enforces) a se-
quence of decisions. The decisions may depend on inter-
action with agents as well as changes to the environment.
In the online mechanism design model, agent types in-
clude arrival times, departure times, and a valuation func-
tion of the decisions made by the algorithm.
Unfortunately, the positive results in the general set-
ting of [21] have been limited to so-called “single valued
preferences” where an agent gets a fixed value r iff one
of a set of “interesting decisions” in made between her
arrival and departure. (The positive results also require
limited misrepresentation of the agent types).
It is important to note that none of the problems we
consider are single valued. For task systems, the k-server
problem, and the parking problem, different decisions will
generally give different value to the agent. Also note that
we do not allow misrepresentation of arrival time, and
insist that departure time be equal to arrival time.
There has been a large body of work on online auc-
tions in the setting where the order of events is a uniformly
random permutation. Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg and Parkes
[9] discuss limited supply online auctions, and Babaioff,
Immorlica, Kempe, and Kleinberg [2] introduced the
knapsack and matroid secretary problems, about which
there has been much subsequent work.
3 Pricing States for Metrical Task Systems
3.1 Problem Definition A metrical task system [3] is
described by a symmetric non-negative m× m matrix,
(dst)1≤s,t≤m, where dss = 0 and the triangle inequality
holds: dst ≤ dsk + dkt for all 1 ≤ s, t,k ≤ m. The set
S = {1, . . . ,m} is the set of states.
The strategic metrical task system is a variant of
the metrical task system where tasks are associated with
agents. Agents arrive online, the ith agent to arrive has
some task to perform, represented by a vector of m non
negative real values,
wi =
(
wi1,w
i
2, . . . ,w
i
m
)
.
The task wi is private to agent i.
The initial state of the system is s0, the state of the
system may change over time. Let si−1 be the state of
the system upon the arrival of agent i. The ith agent to
arrive may decide to change the state of the system upon
her arrival to some other state (i.e., si 6= si−1) or not (i.e.
si = si−1).
Given states s, t, and a task w = (w1,w2, . . . ,wm),
define
C(s, t,w) = wt +dst ,
i.e. the cost to switch states from s to t and process task w
in state t.
A dynamic pricing scheme for strategic metrical task
systems sets prices (surcharges) on the states of the sys-
tem. Formally, a dynamic pricing scheme P= (P1,P2, . . .)
is a sequence of price functions P1,P2, . . ., where the ith
function
Pi :
〈(
s1,w1s1
)
,
(
s2,w2s2
)
, . . . ,
(
si−1,wi−1si−1
)〉
×S 7→ R+.
The information available to the pricing function Pi is
the state s j chosen made by agent j and the work
w js j expended on the jth agent’s task w
j in that state,
for all j < i. This is captured by the sequence〈(
s1,w1s1
)
,
(
s2,w2s2
)
, . . . ,
(
si−1,wi−1si−1
)〉
. The prices com-
puted by pricing function Pi are relevant for agent i.
For notational convenience, we use Pi as a pricing
function over the set of states after i− 1 tasks are pro-
cessed, where the “history” of the system is implicit. We
stress that the pricing is set without any information re-
garding future events.
Note that pricing function Pi cannot depend on tasks
w j, j ≥ i, (this is distinct from an online algorithm that
may depend on wi). Moreover, it knows very little about
w1,w2, . . . ,wi−1. It only knows the decisions made by
the agents and the actual work done, i.e., s j and w
j
s j for
1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1. In particular, this means that the pricing
scheme does not know the optimal cost to process tasks
w1, . . . ,wi−1 and cannot compute the work function for a
state.
The goal of a strategic agent is to to minimize her
disutility. This is the sum of the following components:
1. The work required to do the task in the state selected
by the agent. For agent i this is wisi .
2. The transition cost to change states. For agent i this
is dsi−1si .
3. The surcharge associated with choosing (or remain-
ing in) some state, this is determined by the pricing
scheme (see below). For agent i this is Pi(si).
Therefore, the agent will choose:
si ∈ argmin
s∈Si
{wis+dsi−1s+Pi(s)}
As the goal in metrical task systems is cost minimization,
the target function f is the social cost,
f (σ ,s) =
|σ |
∑
i=1
(
wisi +dsi−1si
)
,
i.e., the sum of all state transitions and task processing
costs. The price of anarchy is as defined in Equation (1.2).
3.2 The Fractional Traversal Algorithm for Metrical
Task Systems We now describe the fractional traversal
algorithm for metrical task systems from [3]. The frac-
tional traversal algorithm solves a relaxation of the origi-
nal problem in that it allows states to perform fractions of
a task, possibly switching states repeatedly until the task
is completed.
A traversal sequence, τ = τ1,τ2, . . ., is an infinite se-
quence of states of the task system, where every state
of the task system may appear several times in the se-
quence. The fractional traversal algorithm given here as
Algorithm 1 is very simple, it executes a fraction of task
until the work done in the current state, since moving to
this state, equals the distance to move to the next state in
the sequence.
Borodin et al. showed the following with regard to
the traversal algorithm:
THEOREM 3.1. (BORODIN ET AL. [3]) • There
exists a traversal sequence such that the fractional
traversal algorithm has a competitive ratio of
8(m− 1). (Versus the optimal competitive ratio of
2m−1 achieved by the work function algorithm).
• Given any online algorithm that schedules tasks
fractionally on multiple states with competitive ratio
c, there exists another online algorithm that executes
the task in a single state with competitive ratio ≤ c.
The following variables are used in the traversal
algorithm (Algorithm 1):
• The current position in the traversal sequence τ is
indicated by the variable j.
• Task wi is (fractionally) executed in states
τti−1 ,τti−1+1, . . . ,τti .
I.e., during the processing of task wi the index j takes
values ti−1, . . . , ti.
• The fraction of task wi that is executed in state τ j is
denoted by λ ij. Note that λ i` = 0 for all ` /∈ ti−1, . . . , ti,
Note too that there may be `,`′ ∈ ti−1, . . . , ti, |`−`′| ≥
2, such that τ` = τ`′ .
• The variable ρ j when dealing with task i represents
the work expended thus far in the jth position of τ .
I.e.,
ρ j = ∑
i′:ti′≤ j≤ti′+1,i′≤i
λ i
′
j w
i′
τ j .
An illustration of the execution of Algorithm 1 is
given in Appendix A.1.
Given a traversal sequence τ = τ1,τ2, . . ., define the
traversal distance between indices ` and `′ to be
δ`,`′ = δ`′,` =
max(`,`′)−1
∑
j=min(`,`′)
dτ j ,τ j+1 .
Note that
• The total work done by the fractional traversal algo-
rithm after completing n tasks is exactly δt0,tn +ρtn .
This follows as the algorithm advances to the next
state in the traversal sequence when the amount of
work done in the current state is equal to the distance
to the next state.
Algorithm 1 The Fractional Traversal Algorithm.
Input: A traversal sequence τ , a set of states S, the
function d, and an online sequence of tasks w1,w2, . . ..
For each task i:
j← ti−1
while (∑ jk=ti−1 λ
i
k < 1)
• λ ij←min
{
d j, j+1−ρ j
wij
,1−∑ j−1k=ti−1 λ ik
}
• ρ j← ρ j +λ ij ·wiτ j
• if ρ j = dτ j ,τ j+1 then j← j+1, ρ j← 0
ti← j
• The total traversal cost to the fractional traversal
algorithm for n tasks is exactly δt0,tn , every transition
from τ j to τ j+1 has transition cost d j, j+1.
We now show that a Traversal Algorithm’s perfor-
mance is monotone with respects to the tasks it receives.
LEMMA 3.1. Let τ be some traversal sequence, and let
w = 〈w1, . . . ,wn〉 and w˜ = 〈w˜1, . . . w˜n〉 be two sequences
of tasks such that for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and every s ∈ S,
we have that w˜is≤wis. The total work done by the traversal
algorithm with respect to τ and w is at least the amount
of work done with respect to τ and w˜.
Proof. Let ti be the position of the traversal algorithm
after processing task i in the task sequence w, and t˜i
the position of the traversal algorithm after processing
task i in the task sequence w˜. In addition, let ρti be the
amount of work done by the algorithm since index ti given
sequence w, and ρ˜t˜i the corresponding amount of work
since reaching t˜i and given task sequence w˜.
We show by an inductive argument that for every
i ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, δt0,ti +ρti ≥ δt˜0,t˜i + ρ˜t˜i . This is clearly true
for i = 0. Let the claim hold before the arrival of the i-th
task. If the traversal algorithm that processes sequence w˜
doesn’t reach ti when processing task w˜i, (t˜i < ti) then
δt0,t˜i +ρt˜i ≤ δt0,t˜i+1
≤ δt0,ti
≤ δt0,ti +ρti .
where the 1st derivation above is by the definition of the
algorithm, the 2nd is by assumption that t˜i < ti and the 3rd
is since ρ j ≥ 0 for all j.
Lets assume that t˜i ≥ ti. We’ll show that it cannot be
that t˜i > ti, and when t˜i = ti we show that ρ˜ti ≤ ρti , thus
concluding the inductive proof.
Because wis ≥ w˜is for every state s, we have that for
every j ∈ {ti−1, . . . , ti−1},
(3.3) λ˜ ij ≥ λ ij,
where λ˜ ij and λ ij are the fractions of tasks w˜i and wi done
in τ j. This follows from the definition of λ in the frac-
tional traversal algorithm and the inductive hypothesis.
Therefore,
λ˜ iti ≤ 1−
ti−1
∑
j=ti−1
λ˜ ij(3.4)
≤ 1−
ti−1
∑
j=ti−1
λ ij(3.5)
= λ iti .
Inequality (3.4) follows since the fraction left over cannot
be more that one minus the fractions already done. In-
equality (3.5) follows from Equation (3.3), and the final
equality is by definition.
Therefore,
ρ˜ti = λ˜
i
ti · w˜i (τti)≤ λ iti ·wiτti = ρti < dti,ti+1,
so t˜i = ti, and we can conclude the induction.
uunionsq
Lemma 3.1 immediately implies that the total cost of the
fractional traversal algorithm given task sequence w˜ is
smaller than the cost of the fractional traversal algorithm
given task sequence w. This is since δt˜0,t˜i ≤ δt0,ti for every
i ∈ {0, . . . ,n}.
3.3 “Follow the Traversal” Algorithm We would like
to come up with a dynamic pricing scheme for metrical
task systems for which agents driven by self interest
follow the traversal sequence.
We now describe an new algorithm which can be
simulated by a dynamic pricing scheme that encourages
greedy agents to “follow” the fractional traversal algo-
rithm. The algorithm, for a given metrical task system (a
set of states S and a distance metric d : S× S 7→ R+) and
traversal sequence τ , receives and processes a sequence of
tasks w1,w2, . . . online.
Roughly speaking, after processing each task, the
algorithm simulates the traversal algorithm presented in
Section 3.2. When handling task i, the algorithm views
all states between its current position in the sequence, and
the fractional traversal algorithm’s current position in the
sequence, ti−1, as a superstate where the cost of a task in
a superstate is the min cost over its constituent states. The
details of the algorithm are given in Algorithm 2.
Even though there may be several indices that mini-
mize c˜, tie breaking can be done arbitrarily, since all the
claims hold for every index which minimizes c˜.
Algorithm 2 “Follow the traversal” algorithm that allows
going to all the states between its current state and the
current state of the traversal algorithm “for free”.
Input: A traversal sequence τ , a set of states S, a distance
metric d and an online sequence of tasks w1,w2, . . ..
Let `i−1 denote the position of the algorithm in the traver-
sal sequence after completing tasks w1, . . . ,wi−1 and ti−1
be the position of the traversal algorithm after completing
these tasks (`0 = t0 = 1).
Given task wi:
1. Let jmin←min(`i−1, ti−1)
and jmax←max(`i−1, ti−1).
2. Let D0←{ jmin, . . . , jmax}.
3. Define c˜( j) =

wiτ j j ∈ D0
wiτ j +δ jmax, j j > jmax
∞ otherwise
4. Set `i← argmin j≥ jmin c˜( j).
3.4 Proof of Approximation
THEOREM 3.2. For any traversal sequence τ , distance
metric d, and sequence of tasks w1, . . . ,wn, let CA2 =
wA2 + dA2 be the total cost of Algorithm 2, and CT =
wT + dT the total cost of the traversal algorithm for that
sequence of tasks (the processing cost plus the transition
cost). Then CA2 ≤ 2 ·CT .
Proof. We use a potential argument. The potential func-
tion we use isΦ= δ`i,ti , which is the traversal distance the
current position of Algorithm 2 and the current position of
the traversal algorithm. We show that for every incoming
task i,
CA2i +∆Φi ≤ 2 ·CTi ,
where CA2i and C
T
i are the costs of Algorithm 2 and
Algorithm 1 respectively when processing the ith task,
and ∆Φi is the change in potential after processing it.
Let Ti = { j : ti−1 ≤ j ≤ ti} be the set of positions
that the traversal algorithm visits while processing the i-
th task, and let λ ij be the amount of work done in τ j in
the traversal while processing the task. Since the traversal
algorithm processes the whole task, ∑ j∈Ti λ
i
j = 1.
Note that
CTi = δti−1,ti + ∑
j∈Ti
λ ij ·wiτ j ,
and also that
(3.6) CA2i ≤ δ`i−1,`i +wiτ`i ,
since Algorithm 2 may use a direct edge from τ`i−1 to
τ`i . By definition, the difference in the potential after
processing the ith task is:
(3.7) ∆Φi =−δ`i−1,ti−1 +δ`i,ti
Let I j be an indicator as to whether τ j /∈ D0. Al-
gorithm 2 chooses an index that minimizes c˜, therefore
wiτ`i + δ jmax,`i · I`i ≤ w
i
τ j + δ jmax, j · I j. Hence, for any j ∈
{ti−1, . . . , ti} we have wiτ`i + δ jmax,`i · I`+1 ≤ w
i
τ j + δ jmax,ti ·
Iti . Since λ
j
i is a convex combination we have:
wiτ`i +δ jmax,`i · I`+1 ≤(3.8)
∑
j∈{ti−1,...ti}
λ ij ·
(
wiτ j +δ jmax,ti · Iti
)
=
∑
j∈{ti−1,...ti}
λ ij ·wiτ j +δ jmax,ti · Iti ≤
CTi .
Case 1: `i−1 ≤ ti−1 and `i ≤ ti−1
`i−1 `i ti−1 ti
In this case, ∆Φ=−δ`i−1,`i +δti−1,ti . Therefore,
CA2i +∆Φ
(3.6)
≤ wiτ`i +δ`i−1,`i +∆Φ
(3.7)
= wiτ`i +δti−1,ti
(3.8)
≤ CTi +δti−1,ti ≤ 2CTi .
Case 2: `i−1 ≤ ti−1 and ti−1 < `i ≤ ti
`i−1 ti−1 `i ti
We have,
CA2i +∆Φ
(3.6)
≤ wiτ`i +δ`i−1,ti−1 +δti−1,`i +∆Φ
(3.7)
= wiτ`i +δti−1,`i +δ`i,ti
(3.8)
≤ CTi +δ`i,ti
≤ 2CTi .
Case 3: `i−1 ≤ ti−1 and ti < `i
`i−1 ti−1 ti `i
CA2i +∆Φ
(3.6)
≤ wiτ`i +δ`i−1,ti−1 +δti−1,`i +∆Φ
(3.7)
= wiτ`i +δti−1,`i +δti,`i
(3.8)
≤ CTi +δti,`i
≤ 2CTi .
Case 4: ti−1 < `i−1 and ti ≤ `i ≤ `i−1
ti−1 ti `i `i−1
In this case, ∆Φ=−δti−1,ti −δ`i,`i−1 . Hence,
CA2i +∆Φ
(3.6)
≤ wiτ`i +δ`i,`i−1 +∆Φ
(3.7)
= wiτ`i −δti−1,ti
(3.8)
≤ CTi .
Case 5: ti−1 < `i−1 and ti ≤ `i−1 < `i
ti−1 ti `i−1 `i
In this case, ∆Φ=−δti−1,ti +δ`i−1,`i . Therefore,
CA2i +∆Φ
(3.6)
≤ wiτ`i +δ`i−1,`i +∆Φ
(3.7)
≤ wiτ`i +2δ`i−1,`i
(3.8)
≤ 2CTi .
Case 6: ti−1 < `i−1 and `i < ti ≤ `i−1
ti−1 `i ti `i−1
In this case, ∆Φ=−δti−1,`i −δti,`i−1 . Therefore,
CA2i +∆Φ
(3.6)
≤ wiτ`i +δ`i,`i−1 +∆Φ
= wiτ`i +δ`i,ti +δti,`i−1 +∆Φ
(3.7)
≤ wiτ`i +δ`i,ti
(3.8)
≤ 2CTi .
Case 7: ti−1 < `i−1 and `i < `i−1 < ti
ti−1 `i `i−1 ti
In this case, ∆Φ = −δ`i,`i−1 − δti−1,`i + δ`i,ti ≤
−δ`i,`i−1 +δti−1,ti . Therefore,
CA2i +∆Φ
(3.6)
≤ wiτ`i +δ`i,`i−1 +∆Φ
(3.7)
≤ wiτ`i +δti−1,ti
(3.8)
≤ 2CTi .
Case 8: ti−1 < `i−1 and `i−1 ≤ `i < ti
ti−1 `i−1 `i ti
In this case, ∆Φ=−δti−1,`i−1 +δ`i,ti ≤ δti−1,ti . There-
fore,
CA2i +∆Φ
(3.6)
≤ wiτ`i +δ`i−1,`i +∆Φ
(3.7)
≤ wiτ`i +δ`i−1,`i +δti−1,ti
(3.8)
≤ 2CTi .
Case 9: ti−1 < `i−1 and `i−1 ≤ ti ≤ `i
ti−1 `i−1 ti `i
In this case, ∆Φ=−δti−1,`i−1 +δti,`i ≤ δ`i−1,`i . There-
fore,
CA2i +∆Φ
(3.6)
≤ wiτ`i +δ`i−1,`i +∆Φ
(3.7)
≤ wiτ`i +2δ`i−1,`i
(3.8)
≤ 2CTi .
uunionsq
3.5 Pricing Scheme In this section, we define a dy-
namic pricing scheme that observes decisions made by
greedy agents and sets a surcharge for the next agent to
arrive. We want to set prices so that states chosen by
(greedy) agents are the same as the ones chosen by Al-
gorithm 2 (up to tie breaking) given the sequence of tasks
w.
The problem is that dynamic pricing schemes, as
we’ve defined them, can only observe the greedy be-
havior of agents. the state chosen by the agents, and
the amount of work done in that state while process-
ing the task; Namely, after agent i has selfishly used
the system, the mechanism observes si, the state cho-
sen by agent i, and wisi , the amount of work done in si
while processing the task, but the other coordinates of wi
(wi1, . . . ,w
i
si−1,w
i
si+1, . . . ,w
i
m) are not known to it.
We resolve this issue by giving the pricing scheme
a different (imaginary) sequence of tasks w˜ with the
following consistency properties:
1. For every i, wisi is equal to w˜
i
si .
2. For every i and for every j ∈ S\{si}, wij ≥ w˜ij.
3. For every i, given the pricing function Pi over the
state of the system after observing events 1, . . . , i−1,
the computed vector w˜i is consistent with the agent
selfishly choosing to process her task in state si; I.e.,
for all j
(3.9) w˜ij +dsi−1, j +Pi( j)≥ wisi +dsi−1,si +Pi(si) .
Note that running Algorithm 2 on the sequence of
tasks w˜ yields a 2-approximation to the cost of the Frac-
tional Traversal Algorithm on the sequence of tasks w: by
Lemma 3.1, the cost of the Fractional Traversal Algorithm
on w˜ is no larger than its cost on w, and by Theorem 3.2,
Algorithm 2 gives a 2-approximation to the cost of the
Fractional Traversal Algorithm (on any sequence, in par-
ticular w˜). Therefore, it suffices to find a pricing scheme
that makes the agents follow Algorithm 2 on sequence w˜.
We show how to find w˜ that satisfies the consistency
properties in Section 3.6. From now on, we assume such
w˜i−1 can be computed after observing agent i’s greedy
behavior. We show how to devise a pricing scheme that
given w˜, makes incoming agents act as though they are
being guided by Algorithm 2 given input w˜. We describe
how to do this in Pricing Scheme 1. We note that although
Pricing Scheme 1 may price states using negative number,
we can increase all prices by a large enough constant
without affecting the decisions of the agents.
THEOREM 3.3. Pricing Scheme 1 makes greedy agents
simulate Algorithm 2 with task sequence w˜ given as input.
Proof. For every state s′ ∈ S, let m(s′) be as defined in
Pricing Scheme 1 and let c˜ be as defined in Algorithm
2. Since m(s′) ∈ argmin j:τ j=s′ c˜( j), we may assume that
Algorithm 2 always prefers m(s′) amongst the indices for
which τ j = s′.
Let s be the state chosen by the agent. If m(s) ∈ D0,
then the disutility of the agent is wis + dsi−1,s + Pi(s) =
wis + dsi−1,s− dsi−1,s = c˜(m(s)). If m(s) /∈ D0, then now
the disutility is wis+dsi−1,s+Pi(s) =w
i
s+dsi−1,s−dsi−1,s+
δ jmax,m(s) = c˜(m(s)).
By the way w˜i is computed, we get that if the algo-
rithm would have received w˜i as input, then given s˜ ∈ S
that was not chosen by agent i, we have that,
Pricing Scheme 1 A dynamic pricing scheme that makes
incoming agents “follow” Algorithm 2.
Input: A traversal sequence τ , a set of states S, a
distance metric d and an observed sequence of deci-
sions (s1,w1s1),(s2,w
2
s2), . . . ,(si−1,w
i
si−1), made by agents
1,2, . . . , i−1.
The variables `i−1 and ti−1 represent two indices in the
traversal sequence, set after the i−1th agent’s decision.
For i−1 = 0 take `0← 1 and t0← 1.
Setting prices for agent i:
1. Let jmin←min(`i−1, ti−1)
and jmax←max(`i−1, ti−1).
2. Let D0←{ jmin, . . . , jmax}.
3. For a state s let m(s)←min{ j ≥ jmin|τ j = s}.
4. Define Pi(s)≡
{
−dsi−1,s m(s) ∈ D0,
−dsi−1,s+δ jmax,m(s) otherwise.
Determining `i and ti after observing (si,wisi):
1. Set `i← m(si).
2. Compute w˜i using the set of equations (3.10) as
described in Section 3.6.
3. Update ti as done by the Fractional Traversal Algo-
rithm (Algorithm 1) using w˜i as input.
• if m(s˜) ∈ D0, then
c˜(m(s˜)) = w˜is˜+dsi−1,s˜−dsi−1,s˜
= w˜is˜+dsi−1,s˜+Pi(s˜)
≥ wis+dsi−1,s+Pi(s)
= c˜(m(s)),
where the third inequality is derived from (3.9), and
• if m(s˜) /∈ D0, then
c˜(m(s˜)) = w˜is˜+dsi−1,s˜−dsi−1,s˜+δ jmax,m(s˜)
= w˜is˜+dsi−1,s˜+Pi(s˜)
≥ wis+dsi−1,s+Pi(s)
= c˜(m(s)),
where the third inequality is derived from (3.9).
Therefore, the agent picks a state s such that m(s)
minimizes c˜ given task w˜i. Algorithm 2 also chooses
an index that minimizes c˜. Since the tie breaking of
Algorithm 2 can be done arbitrarily, we can assume that
the algorithm chooses index m(s) as well when given task
w˜i. uunionsq
COROLLARY 3.1. Pricing Scheme 1 yields a price of
anarchy of 16(m−1).
3.6 Computing “Imaginary” Tasks As mentioned in
Section 3.5, Pricing Scheme 1 cannot observe the real
sequence of task vectors w. This is problematic, since
the pricing scheme runs a simulation of the fractional
traversal algorithm, which takes the task vectors as input.
To resolve this issue, we need to compute imaginary
task vectors with the three consistency properties, as
described in Section 3.5. We are given a pricing function
Pi : S 7→ R+ that is set on states of the task system after
the arrival of the i−1-th agent, a state si chosen by the i-
th agent, and the amount of work done in that state while
processing the tasks (which is exactly wisi ). Let w
i =(
wi1,w
i
2, . . . ,w
i
m
)
be the current incoming task (which we
cannot observe). We claim that the vector w˜i defined
below is coordinate-wise dominated by wi and consistent
with the agent greedily choosing to process the task in si
while the states are priced using Pi:
w˜ij :=max{0,(3.10)
wisi +dsi−1,si +Pi (si)−dsi−1, j−Pi( j)}
for all j ∈ S. Note that w˜isi = wisi .
By definition, wij ≥ 0, and since the agent chooses
si, we have that wij + dsi−1, j + Pi( j) ≥ wisi + dsi−1,si +
Pi (si) , i.e., wij ≥ wisi + dsi−1,si + Pi (si)− dsi−1, j − Pi( j).
Therefore, it holds that wij ≥ w˜ij. In addition, since
w˜ij ≥ wisi + dsi−1,si +Pi (si)− dsi−1, j −Pi( j), we have that
w˜ij + dsi−1, j +Pi( j) ≥ wisi + dsi−1,si +Pi (si) as required in
(3.9). We conclude that we are able to compute a task
vector which satisfies the desired consistency properties,
thus enabling us to devise pricing over states that insures
a nearly optimal price of anarchy.
4 Pricing Servers on Trees
The k-server problem, introduced by Manasse et al. [19],
is defined as follows. Let (V,d) be a fixed metric space.
There are k servers, initially located in specified points
S0 = {s01,s02, . . . ,s0k} s.t. for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, s0j ∈ V , that can
be moved by the algorithm. Moving a server from x to y
costs d(x,y). The goal is to serve a sequence of arriving
requests with minimum possible cost. Each request ri is a
point in V , and to serve it, the algorithm has to move (at
least) one server to that point.
In our setting, we assume that the requests are made
by successive agents. Moreover, we assume that each
agent is greedy, and will therefore ask that their request
is served with the server that minimizes the sum of its
distance to the request and the price we set for the server.
Therefore, before the arrival of the ith agent, the algorithm
sets a payment function for the servers: Pi : Si−1 7→R, and
agent i would choose to move server:
`i ∈ argmin
j
{d(ri,si−1j )+Pi(si−1j )},
and the next state would be
Si = Si−1 \{si−1`i }∪{ri}.
The social cost is defined as:
f (σ ,s) =
|σ |
∑
i=1
d(si−1`i ,ri).
On a high level, we want to find out if any algorithm
can be simulated by appropriate pricing, i.e., whether
given an algorithm A and its current state (locations of
servers), we can give a pricing of servers that will make
an arriving greedy agent with a request r, serve r in the
same way that A would have, wherever the request occurs.
For some algorithms, designing a payment scheme
is straightforward. For instance, Irani and Rubinfeld
proved that the following 2-server algorithm Balance2 is
10-competitive on any metric space [10]. The algorithm
keeps track of the total distance that each of the two
servers has traveled, and serves each request with the
server that minimizes the sum of its distance to the request
and half the total distance it has traveled before. Clearly,
setting the price of each server to the second summand,
i.e., half the total distance the server has moved already,
will make the agents follow the algorithm. The only catch
is that we have no control over tie-breaking since it is done
by the agents. However, this can only affect the total cost
by an additive constant.
In general, however, simulating any algorithm A is
not as easy. For instance, A could move many servers (in
a non-lazy fashion) upon a request. This is the case with
some known algorithms, for example with the Double
Coverage (DC) algorithm [4] that is k-competitive for the
line metric. This algorithm has been generalized to all
tree metrics, retaining the optimal ratio [5]. As an agent
is only allowed to pick a server that will serve the request,
such complex algorithms cannot be simulated directly.
In this work, we restrict our attention to k-server in
tree metrics, and the optimal algorithm for this setting [5]
in particular. We observe that the standard transformation
to make the algorithm lazy, if done carefully, preserves its
other properties, which we call locality and monotonicity
(all defined later), and that combined these enable sim-
ulation by a pricing scheme. We remark that, in general,
such transformation employs keeping track of “virtual po-
sitions” of servers and basing decisions on those. This
makes designing a pricing scheme to simulate the algo-
rithm challenging, since an agent’s decision is based on
the “real positions” of the servers (and their prices).
4.1 Notation Given an algorithm A, let SA =
{s1, . . . ,sk} denote its state, i.e., the set of points
where A’s servers are currently located. We will associate
the servers with the points they are in. Similarly, we will
associate a request r with the point in which it occurs.
Given two points v and w in a tree, we letP(v,w) denote
the unique path between v and w. We say that a server
s ∈ SA is adjacent for a point v ifP(v,s)∩SA = {s}, i.e.,
there is no other server from SA on the pathP(v,s).
A deterministic online algorithm is lazy if the only
moves it makes consist in moving a single server to the
current request. An algorithm is local if it always serves
a request with a server that is adjacent to it. Furthermore,
an algorithm A is monotone if it satisfies the following
property: given SA and a request at r, if the algorithm
would serve a request at r with s ∈ SA, then it would also
serve a request at any vertex on the pathP(r,s) with s.
4.2 Matchings Later, we give a transformation that
takes an algorithm A and returns an “equivalent” algo-
rithm A′ that is lazy. This transformation relies on mini-
mum cost (perfect, bipartite) matching of SA to SA′ , where
the costs are specified by the metric distance d. Given two
sets of points X and Y of equal cardinality, we denote any
such matching by M(X ,Y ) and its cost by d(X ,Y ).
When the metric space is a line, we associate points
with real numbers, use inequalities to specify the order
of points, and note that d(x,y) = |x− y|. Moreover, we
remark that in such case there exists a perfect matching
of particular structure. Namely, given X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xk}
and Y = {y1,y2, . . . ,yk} that are sorted from left to right,
i.e., x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xk and y1 ≤ y2 ≤ . . . ≤ yk, we call a
matching in which xi is matched to yi for all i a canonical
matching and denote itM (X ,Y ).
LEMMA 4.1. The canonical matching on a line is a min-
imum cost perfect matching.
Proof. Let M = M(X ,Y ) be any minimum cost perfect
matching of X to Y . We show how M can be transformed
to the canonical matching without increasing its cost. As
long as M is not canonical, find the minimum i such that
xi is not matched to yi. Then xi is matched to some
y j and yi is matched to some xh. Moreover, j > i and
h > i since i is minimal. We assume wlog that xi ≤ yi
(if not, swap the sets). This implies that y j ≥ yi ≥ xi.
Modify M as follows: match xi with yi and xh with y j.
Matching xi to yi decreases the total distance by y j − yi.
By the triangle inequality, |xh−y j| ≤ |xh−yi|+ |yi−y j|=
|xh − yi|+ y j − yi, i.e., matching xh to y j increases the
total distance by at most y j − yi. Hence, the cost does
not increase throughout the transformation, and is thus
minimized by the canonical matchingM (X ,Y ) we obtain
at the end. uunionsq
Given X and Y and a point r ∈ X , we call a matching
Algorithm 3 The algorithm transformation.
Input: An algorithm A and an online sequence of requests
r1, . . . ,ri.
Output: A lazy algorithm A′.
1. Let SA be the state of A after serving ri and SA′ the
state of A′ right before serving ri; note that ri ∈ SA.
2. Find M = M(SA,SA′) and serve ri with the server
matched to it in M.
of X to Y r-local if r is matched to a point in Y that is
adjacent to it.
LEMMA 4.2. For any two sets of points X and Y such that
|X | = |Y | in a tree and a given point r ∈ X, there exists a
minimum cost perfect matching of X to Y that is r-local.
Proof. Let M = M(X ,Y ) be any minimum cost perfect
matching of X to Y . If M is not r-local, do the following.
Let y be the point in Y that r is matched to. Then there
are other points from Y on the pathP(y,r); let y′ be the
one that is closest to r (the last one on the path to it). It
follows that y′ is local for r. Let x ∈ X be the point that
y′ is matched to. Turn M into another perfect matching
M′ by matching r to y′ and x to y. Since y′ ∈P(y,r), we
have d(y′,r) = d(y,r)−d(y′,y). Moreover, by the triangle
inequality d(x,y) ≤ d(x,y′)+ d(y′,y). Thus, the cost of
M′ is no larger than that of M, and hence M′ is an r-local
minimum cost perfect matching of X to Y . uunionsq
We denote a (fixed) r-local minimum cost matching
of X to Y by Mr(X ,Y ). In particular, for the line metric,
we call the r-local matching that is the result of the
procedure described in the proof of Lemma 4.2 applied
to M (X ,Y ) an r-canonical matching, and denote it by
Mr(X ,Y ).
4.3 Algorithm transformation Algorithm 3 describes
how to transform any algorithm A into an equivalent one
that is lazy and never incurs larger cost than A. Later,
we observe that (wlog) the output algorithm is also local.
Finally, we note that for DC the transformation also
preserves monotonicity.
In general, the transformation only guarantees that
its output is a lazy algorithm of no larger cost than A.
The additional properties rely on particular structure of
the input algorithm and the matching that is used upon
requests.
LEMMA 4.3. Given an algorithm A, the transformation
produces a lazy algorithm A′ such that for every sequence
of requests R= r1, . . . ,ri, it holds that C (A′,R)≤C (A,R).
Proof. It follows directly from the transformation that A′
is lazy. In order to bound its cost, denote the costs of
Algorithm 4 Double Coverage on a line.
Input: A request r on the line.
1. Let sL and sR be the servers of DC immediately to the
left of r and right of r respectively. (Note that one of
them may not exist; in such case ignore it.)
2. Move both sL and sR towards r by
min{d(sL,r),d(sR,r)}.
3. Serve r with the server that reached it. (Note that
both sL and sR could have.)
A and A′ upon serving request ri by Ci(A) and Ci(A′)
respectively. We will prove that
(4.11) Ci(A′)+∆Φ≤Ci(A) ,
whereΦ= d(SA,SA′) is a non-negative potential function.
To prove (4.11), it suffices to consider the moves of A
and A′ independently, in this order. Fix M = M(SA,SA′).
We keep M fixed as A moves its servers. Clearly,
when A moves a server s by distance d, the cost of M does
not increase by more than d. Hence, the same holds for
the perfect matching of minimum cost. Thus Φ increases
by at most d, and (4.11) holds.
Once A is done with its moves, we analyze the move
of A′. Note that at this point ri ∈ SA, i.e., A has one of
its servers at ri. Let M = M(SA,SA′) be a minimum cost
matching of the algorithms’ servers and s ∈ SA′ the server
of A′ that is matched to ri. Upon the move of s to ri, Φ
decreases by at least d(s,ri) since this is the case if we
keep M fixed. (It is actually easy to see that there is no
cheaper matching). Thus, Ci(A′)+∆Φ≤ 0 holds. uunionsq
REMARK 4.1. The transformation produces a lazy local
algorithm if, upon each request ri, an ri-local matching is
used.
Note that we have proved that the algorithm that
our transformation produces is local but not that it is
monotone. Nevertheless, for the case of line and the
Double Coverage (DC) algorithm [4, 5], we can prove
monotonicity.
4.4 Transforming DC on a line The Double Coverage
(DC) algorithm has been originally designed for the line
metric [4], and later generalized to all tree metrics [5]. For
these metrics, it attains the optimal competitive ratio of k.
For completeness, we describe DC for the case of the line
metric in Algorithm 4.
To prove that DC on a line can be transformed to
a lazy local monotone algorithm, we will rely on the
fact that DC itself is local and monotone, as well as on
properties of canonical matchings on a line.
LEMMA 4.4. Applied to DC on a line, the transformation
produces a lazy local monotone algorithm if, upon each
request ri, an ri–canonical matching is used.
Proof. We focus on monotonicity since the other prop-
erties follows from Lemma 4.3 and Remark 4.1. To
this end, let DC′ be the output of the transformation and
SDC′ = {s1, . . . ,sk}, where s1 ≤ s2 ≤ . . . ≤ sk, its current
state. Since for each request r, we use the r-local canon-
ical matching in the transformation, r will be served by a
server of DC′ that is local for it. In particular, DC′ will
serve a request r≤ s1 with s1 and a request r≥ sk with sk.
Similarly, DC′ will serve a request at position of one its
servers s with s.
Now consider si < r < si+1, i.e., a request between
two adjacent servers of DC′. Suppose that DC serves
r with its j-th leftmost server. Recall that an r-local
canonical matching between the state of DC after serving
r to SDC′ would be used in the transformation for a request
(at) r. In the canonical matching r would be matched to
s j but as this matching is made local, r is matched to the
last server of DC′ on the path from s j to r. In other words,
r is matched to si if j ≤ i and to si+1 otherwise, and it
is served by the server it is matched to. Since DC itself is
local monotone, j is a non-decreasing function of r, which
implies that DC′ is monotone. uunionsq
4.5 Payment scheme We define a payment scheme as
P : SA 7→ R. The disutility of an agent while serving a
request r using server s is defined as d(r,s)+P(s). We
assume that at each iteration the request r is served using
the server s that minimizes d(r,s)+P(s), where r is the
request the incoming agent wishes to serve.
THEOREM 4.1. For every lazy local monotone determin-
istic k-server algorithm A on a tree, there exists a payment
scheme P that makes incoming agents weakly follow A
and incur movement cost no larger than that of A.
See the remarks after the proof for explanation what
“weakly” means.
Proof. We obtain the desired pricing P by fixing the price
of an arbitrary server in SA and setting the remaining
prices so that they satisfy a system of linear equations.
The equations follow from the following consideration.
Let SA be the state of the A. Since A is lazy local
monotone, for every server s ∈ SA, there is subtree con-
taining s consisting of all the points that would be served
by s if a request were made there. Clearly, these subtrees
form a partition of the underlying tree. From now on we
refer to these subtrees as regions that particular servers
are responsible for to avoid confusion. Since the underly-
ing space is a tree, the adjacency relation on the regions
defines a subtree spanning the regions.
Let s and s′ be a pair of servers whose regions
are adjacent. Then, there is a threshold point v(s,s′)
(which may be one of s, s′) on the path P(s,s′) such
that, ignoring v(s,s′) itself, the algorithm would serve
all requests on P(s,v(s,s′)) with s and all requests on
P(s′,v(s,s′)) with s′; a request at v(s,s′) would be served
with either of s, s′. Having identified the threshold vertex
v(s,s′), we introduce the following equation:
(4.12) P(s)+d(s,v(s,s′)) = P(s′)+d(s′,v(s,s′)) .
We claim that the system of equation(s) (4.12) taken
for all pairs of adjacent servers has a unique solution once
the price for an arbitrary server is fixed. This follows,
since we introduced one equation per edge of the tree
of regions; in particular, acyclicity guarantees that the
equations are independent. In fact, the pricing that is
the unique solution to our system can be found by a BFS
traversal of G, starting at the vertex with fixed price, and
using (4.12) at each newly visited node to determine its
price.
To see that the pricing P makes the agents follow the
algorithm, consider a request at point v that A would serve
with s. Then for any s′ ∈ SA, consider the path from s′ to v,
and let s′ = s0,s1, . . . ,si = S be the sequence of servers re-
sponsible for successive regions on it. By (4.12), for each
j < i, we have P(s j) = P(s j+1) + d(s j+1,v(s j,s j+1))−
d(s j,v(s j,s j+1)) ≥ P(s j+1)− d(s j+1,s j). Summing the
inequalities over a prefix of the path, we get that for all
j ≤ i
(4.13) P(s′) = P(s0)≥ P(s j)−d(s0,s j) .
Therefore, if the server s = si itself lies on the path,
(4.13) yields that P(s′) + d(s′,v) = P(s′) + d(s′,s) +
d(s,v) ≥ P(s) + d(s,v), i.e., that s minimizes the disu-
tility among servers responsible for the regions along
the path. If s does not lie on this path, i.e., if v
lies between s′ and s, we note that by (4.13) for j =
i− 1, P(s′) + d(s′,v) = P(s′) + d(s′,si−1) + d(si−1,v) ≥
P(si−1) + d(si−1,v). But as the region si−1 is responsi-
ble for is adjacent to the one s is responsible for, (4.12)
guarantees that P(s) + d(s,v) ≤ P(s) + d(s,v(s,si−1)) =
P(si−1)+d(si−1,v(s,si−1))≤ P(si−1)+d(si−1,v). Thus s
minimizes the disutility also in this case, and thus overall.
uunionsq
As noted before, we stress that tie-breaking is up to
the agents, and therefore we cannot guarantee that the
agents will follow an algorithm exactly. This is what we
mean by saying in Theorem 4.1 that the agents “weakly
follow” such algorithm. However, tie-breaking affects
neither Lemma 4.3 nor Remark 4.1, i.e., even if agents
break ties differently than the algorithm, in particular,
even if they move non-local servers, we can still price the
servers in such a way that the cost of moving servers by
the agents is no larger than the cost of moving them by the
algorithm.
We sketch why this is the case. If for a given request
r, more than one adjacent server minimizes the disutility
of serving r, then r is exactly at the threshold vertex of the
pricing scheme’s design, i.e., the boundary of at least two
regions. Then it is easy to see that either server can be
matched to r in a minimum cost matching, i.e., a move
of either server could result from the transformation,
depending on the matching that is chosen. To deal with
non-adjacent servers, it is easiest to assume that for any
pair of adjacent servers si and si+1, the threshold vertex
v(si,si+1) is always strictly between them. This can be
done by moving the vertex by arbitrarily small ε > 0 away
from the server s it coincides with. Clearly, this may
result in violating (4.11) only by 2ε , and we can make
ε decrease exponentially for successive requests, so that
the total additional additive cost is at most c · ε , where c
can also be made arbitrarily small.
COROLLARY 4.1. There exists a payment scheme for the
k-server problem on a line which yields a price of anarchy
of k.
5 Pricing Parking Slots on a City Block
5.1 Problem Definition We consider the following
strategic parking problem; the underlying problem is
known as the (online) metric matching but we use the
parking terminology.
The “town” is modeled as an undirected graph G =
(V,E), |V | = m. Vertices of G represent empty parking
slots, which are the possible destinations of drivers arriv-
ing in town. Every edge e = (u,v) ∈ E has an associated
weight we, corresponding to the distance between vertices
v and u.
As for the cars:
• A total of n cars are going to park over time (n≤m).
Cars do not depart until every car has parked.
• Cars arrive online, one at a time, in order of their
index, 1,2, . . . ,n.
• Cars can only park at unoccupied parking spots.
• Cars behave selfishly and seek to minimize their
disutility (defined below).
We denote the parking spot taken by car i by x(i), and
call the function x : [n] 7→V that maps cars to parking slots
an assignment.
A dynamic pricing scheme P = (P1,P2, . . . ,Pn),
where
Pi : {x(1),x(2), . . . ,x(i−1)}×V 7→ R ,
sets a price for an unoccupied parking space v ∈ V
given that there are i − 1 occupied parking spaces:
x(1), . . . ,x(i− 1). The functions Pi may use random bits.
Set P0(v) = 0 for all v ∈V (or any other constant). When
we refer to Pi(v), we assume that i− 1 cars have already
arrived and are parked at x(1), . . . ,x(i−1). Thus,
• Given G and i ∈ 1, . . . ,n, and given that cars
j ∈ 1, . . . , i − 1 are already parked at locations
x(1), . . . ,x(i− 1), Pi(v) ∈ R gives a price to park at
v ∈V \{x(1), . . . ,x(i−1)}. This is a one-time park-
ing fee, not (say) charged by the hour.
• The current parking fees, Pi(v), v ∈ V \
{x(1), . . . ,x(i − 1)} are known to car i before
parking.
Incentives for cars are determined as follows:
• Let g(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n the be destination of car i, g is
called the goal function.
• Given the graph G, goal function g, and assign-
ment function x, the non-monetary cost to agent
i ∈ [n] with destination g(i) and an assigned parking
slot x(i) is d (g(i) ,x(i)), the weight of a minimum
weight path from x(i) to g(i) in G.
• The disutility of agent i (who chooses to park at
unoccupied slot x(i)) is d (g(i) ,x(i))+Pi(x(i)). I.e.,
the disutility is the sum of the non-monetary cost to
agent i plus the parking fee to park at x(i).
Therefore, the agent will choose to park at:
si = argmin
s∈Si
{d (g(i) ,s)+Pi(s)},
where Si is the set of unoccupied vertices of G at the time
agent i’s arrival.
As the goal is cost minimization, the target function
f is the social cost,
f (σ ,s) =
|σ |
∑
i=1
d (g(i) ,s) ,
i.e., the sum of all the agents’ distances from their goals.
Since the pricing schemes presented in this section
are randomized, the price of anarchy, defined in Equation
(1.2) should be taken in expectation, and is defined as
(5.14) max
σ ,s∈eq(P,σ)
E
(
f (σ ,s)
)
f (σ ,opt(σ))
,
where eq(P,σ) is the set of equilibria assignments of P,
which depends on the random bits used in P.
We refer to the pricing scheme P that satisfies Pi(v) =
0 for all i ∈ 1, . . . ,n, all x(1), . . . ,x(i− 1) and all v ∈
V \ {x(1), . . . ,x(i− 1)} as the free parking, and its price
of anarchy as the cost of free parking.
5.2 Dynamic Harmonic Pricing for the Weighted
Line Graph In this section we describe the harmonic
pricing scheme that guaranties an O
(
min
{
logR,n2
})
ap-
proximation to the minimal cost matching in expectation,
where R is the aspect ratio of the underlying metric. The
expectation is over the random bits of the mechanism.
The coordination mechanisms sets fees to the vacant park-
ing slots. The payments are devised without knowing the
goals of the drivers. Once set, a car parks so as to mini-
mize its disutility.
The improved approximation guaranties of this
mechanism should be compared with the Ω(2n) approx-
imation lower bound for the greedy matching on the
weighted line graph with free parking [11, 14]. On the
same input, the harmonic pricing scheme incurs a cost of
n in expectation.
The pricing is designed to emulate the Harmonic
Algorithm of Gupta and Lewi [8] for a line metric. This
simple algorithm works as follows: let dl be the distance
of the arriving car from the nearest free parking slot to
the left of it, and dr be its distance from the nearest free
parking slot to the right. The algorithm assigns the car to
the slot on the left with probability drdl+dr , and to the slot
on the right with the remaining probability. Gupta and
Lewi proved the following.
THEOREM 5.1. ([8]) Let dmax be the maximal distance
between two vertices, and let dmin be the minimal one.
The competitive ratio of the harmonic algorithm on a line
metric is O
(
log dmaxdmin
)
.
Theorem 5.1 yields an O(logn) approximation algo-
rithm to the min cost matching in the case where quantity
dmax/dmin, called the aspect ratio of the metric, can be
bounded by a polynomial of n. In fact, Gupta and Lewi [8]
also show how this algorithm can be combined with the
doubling technique so that effectively the aspect ratio is
always bounded by a polynomial of n. This relies on con-
tinuous estimation of the optimum cost and modifying the
metric distances based on that.
We provide two pricing schemes. The price of anar-
chy of the simpler one matches the competitive ratio guar-
antee of Harmonic as stated in Theorem 5.1. The more so-
phisticated pricing scheme matches the refined bound of
O(logn) given an estimate of the (final) optimum social
cost a priori.
5.2.1 Computing the posted parking fees We now
show how to set prices to the vacant parking slots that ef-
fectively makes incoming [selfish] agents park as though
they were obeying orders given by the Harmonic Algo-
rithm. As the algorithm is randomized, so will be the
pricing.
We say that a pricing scheme ensures harmonic be-
havior if, when an agent arrives:
• She chooses to park at her goal if vacant.
• Otherwise, she chooses between the two closest
vacant slots to the left and right of her goal with
harmonic probabilities.
A maximal contiguous run of occupied parking
spaces is called a block.
Just before car i is set to park, let V ′ = {v1, . . . ,vk}
the set of vacant parking spots and let B1,B2, . . . ,B` ⊆ V
the current set of “blocks”. We use L(B j) to denote the
first available vertex to the left of block B j, for some
j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, and let R(B j) denote the first available
vertex to the right of B j. Let d j = d (L(B j) ,R(B j)),
we define a set of distributions D1,D2, . . . ,D`, where for
every j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, D j is uniformly distributed on the
real interval [−d j,d j].
Let P : V ′ 7→R+ be a random function that sets prices
to vacant slots. Previously, this function was denoted Pi,
but we omit the index i for the remainder of this section.
We say that P satisfies the Harmonic Payment Condi-
tions if:
1. For any j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, P(L(B j))−P(R(B j))∼ D j.
2. For any u,v ∈ V ′ s.t. there are no unoccupied
parking slots between them: −d (u,v) < P(u) −
P(v)< d (u,v).
LEMMA 5.1. Any pricing function P that satisfies the
Harmonic Payment Conditions, ensures harmonic be-
haviour on the part of arriving cars, regardless of their
goals.
Proof. First, notice that the second condition of the har-
monic payment conditions implies that for any u,v ∈ V ′,
−d (u,v) < P(u)− P(v) < d (u,v), even if there are va-
cant slots between them. This implies that if an agent’s
goal, g, is vacant, then for all v ∈ V ′ \ {g}, we have that
P(g)< P(v)+d (g,v). Ergo, if the agent’s goal is vacant,
she parks there.
Now consider an agent whose goal v is blocked, i.e.,
v ∈ B j for some j ∈ {1, . . . , `}. Let vL denote L(B j) and
vR denote R(B j). For every vacant slot v′ ∈ V ′ left of vL
we have d (v,vL)+P(vL)< d (v,vL)+d (vL,v′)+P(v′) =
d (v,v′)+P(v′). Symmetrically, for every vacant slot v′
right of vR, we have that d (v,vR) + P(vR) < d (v,v′) +
P(v′). Therefore, the agent has only to choose between
vL and vR.
Let Fj be the density function of distribution D j.
Notice that Fj (x) =
x+d j
2d j
. We have that:
Pr [The agent takes vL]
= Pr [d (v,vL)+P(vL)≤ d (v,vR)+P(vR)]
= Pr [P(vL)−P(vR)< d (v,vR)−d (v,vL)]
= Pr [P(vL)−P(vR)< d j−2d (v,vL)]
= Fj (d j−2d (v,vL))
=
2d j−2d (v,vL)
2d j
=
d (v,vR)
d j
,
where the forth equality is due to the first harmonic
payment condition. Therefore, we get that the agent
follows the harmonic behavior. uunionsq
Next, we show a specific pricing scheme that satisfies
the harmonic payment conditions.
OBSERVATION 5.1. Let R(v) be the set { j ∈ {1, . . . , `} :
v is left of B j} and let q1 ∼ D1,g2 ∼ D2, . . . ,q` ∼ D`. For
any constant c, setting P(v) = c+∑ j∈R(v) q j satisfies the
Harmonic Payment Conditions.
We can use the constant c in order to obtain a pricing
scheme that satisfies the harmonic payment conditions in
which there are no negative transfers. One can ask for
a pricing scheme that optimizes an additional objective:
minimizes the sum of prices of all vacant parking slots,
the maximal price of a slot, the difference in pricing of
the slots over time, etc. We can use an LP to satisfy such
objectives. For example, Linear Program 1 minimizes
the sum of prices of slots given q j ∼ D j as prescribed in
Observation 5.1. Note that Linear Program 1 is feasible
since the payment scheme of Observation 5.1 satisfies all
its constraints.
Since we have shown there exists a pricing scheme
which makes incoming agents simulate the behavior of
the harmonic algorithm, we can use this pricing scheme
to coordinate incoming agents, and improve the PoA
significantly.
In graphs where the aspect ratio is bounded by some
polynomial in n, we get:
COROLLARY 5.1. Any pricing scheme which satisfies the
harmonic payment conditions gives an O(logn) approxi-
mation to the optimal assignment when the aspect ratio is
bounded by poly(n).
For general weighted line graphs, without further assump-
tions, we get the following:
THEOREM 5.2. Any pricing scheme which satis-
fies the harmonic payment conditions gives an
O
(
min{log dmaxdmax ,n2}
)
approximation to the optimal
assignment in weighted line graphs in expectation.
Linear Program 1 A linear program for pricing that satis-
fies the harmonic payment conditions and also minimizes
the sum of parking fees over all parked cars. Note that this
program actually minimizes the sum of the posted prices
of vacant parking spaces, but — any feasible solution to
this LP results in the same harmonic behavior so, by re-
peatedly computing such pricing, we minimize the sum of
payments of all parked cars.
min∑v∈V ′ pv s.t.
• ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, pL(B j) = pR(B j)+q j.
• ∀u,v ∈ V ′ s.t. there is no vacant slot between them,
−d (u,v)< pu− pv < d (u,v).
• ∀v ∈V ′, pv ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof that the harmonic algorithm is
O
(
log dmaxdmax
)
competitive is given in [8]. For proving that
the competitive ratio is also bounded by O(n2), we use the
same notation as in [8]2.
Replacing the final bound on E[δmax|δ1] in the proof
of Lemma 4 [8] by the following one gives us the desired
result.
LEMMA 5.2. E[δmax|δ1]≤ n2δ1.
Proof. First note that δmax is the distance between two
servers on the line, therefore there are at most n2 possible
values for this distance. Let J be the set of possible
distances. We get that
Epi [δmax|δ1] =∑
k∈J
k Pr[δmax = k|δ1]≤∑
k∈J
k Pr[δmax ≥ k|δ1]
=∑
k∈J
kQδ1,k ≤∑
k∈J
k
δ1
k
=∑
k∈J
δ1 = |J|δ1
≤ n2δ1 ,
where Qδ1,k ≤ δ1k by Lemma 4(ii) of [8]. uunionsq uunionsq
5.2.2 Pricing with a Prior In this section we show
how to improve the expected PoA via a dynamic pricing
scheme when the city planner has an estimate of the cost
of the optimal matching. This seems to be a reasonable
assumption in many scenarios, since the city planner only
needs to approximate the optimal matching to within
a poly(n) factor in order to devise a pricing scheme
that achieves an O(logn) approximation. This is an
improvement over the harmonic pricing scheme whenever
the aspect ratio is superpolynomial in n.
2A full version is available at http://theory.stanford.edu/
˜klewi/papers/metric-matching-full.pdf but its analysis of
Harmonic is slightly different.
Gupta and Lewi show that given Z ∈ [OPT,c ·OPT]
where c > 1, one can get an O(logcn) approximation
using the following metric change:
• Disconnect every edge with weight ≥ Z.
• Change every edge of weight smaller than Z/(2c ·n2)
to be of weight exactly Z/(2c ·n2).
Let d′ denote the new metric after the transformation.
First, note that the aspect ratio in d′ is 2c · n3, since the
maximal distance is at most Zn, while the minimal one
is at least Z/(2c · n2). Another key observation is that
since the optimal matching doesn’t use any disconnected
edges and the weight of each edge increased by at most
Z/(2c · n2), the cost of every matched server-request in
the optimal matching increased by at most Z/(2c · n).
Therefore, if OPT denotes both the optimal matching in
(V,d) and its cost in (V,d), then the cost of OPT in (V,d′)
is at most OPT+ Z/2c ≤ 1.5OPT. As the weights in d
are no larger than in d′, running the harmonic algorithm
in (V,d′) yields an O(logcn) approximation to OPT in
(V,d).
Thus, given Z, an estimate of the cost of the optimal
matching, a dynamic pricing scheme needs to simulate
the change in the metric. Specifically, the pricing scheme
needs to:
1. Make sure agents don’t “jump over” edges of weight
bigger than Z.
2. Make incoming agents simulate the behavior of the
harmonic algorithm according to the transformed
metric by acting selfishly.
We say that an online matching algorithm is mono-
tone if the following conditions hold:
1. If an incoming request is at a position of an un-
matched server, the server will be matched to that
request.
2. Let B j be some block of matched servers, let vL =
L(B j) and vR = R(B j). Consider any two points
a,b ∈ B j and a request to be made at either of them.
Then
d (a,vL)≤ d (b,vL) ⇐⇒
Pr [request at a would be matched to vL]
≥ Pr [request at b would be matched to vL] .
It is easy to see that running the harmonic algorithm on
both the original and the transformed metrics yields a
monotone algorithm. The following theorem shows that
every monotone algorithm can be priced:
THEOREM 5.3. Every monotone online algorithm for the
min cost matching problem on a line can be transformed
into a dynamic pricing scheme which makes incoming
agents simulate the algorithm.
Proof. Let A be a monotone algorithm for the online min
cost matching problem. Let B1,B2, . . . ,B` ⊆ V be the
blocks that represent the current state of the graph, and
let V ′ = V \⋃`j=1 B j the set of vacant parking slots. Let
vL = L(B j) and vR = R(B j). Let p
j
L : B j 7→ (0,1] be a
probability function that maps every vertex in the block
into the probability of the vertex being matched by vL in
A. Let Vj = {v1j ,v2j , . . . ,vtj} ⊆ B j the set of vertices for
which p jL
(
v1j
)
> p jL
(
v2j
)
> .. . > p jL
(
vtj
)
. We define a
distribution D j which determines the difference between
P(vR) and P(vL). For every i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, let ∆i =
d
(
vij,vL
)
−d
(
vij,vR
)
.
D j is defined via the following cumulative density
function Fj :
Fj(∆) =

0 ∆≤−d j
1− p jL
(
vij
)
∆i ≥ ∆> ∆i−1
1 ∆> d j,
where ∆0 =−d j and ∆t+1 = d j. From A’s monotonicity, it
is clear that−d j ≤ ∆1 ≤ ∆2 ≤ . . .≤ ∆t ≤ d j, and therefore
Fj is a valid density function.
We claim that a dynamic pricing scheme P : V ′ 7→
R+ that satisfies the following two conditions makes
incoming agents simulate algorithm A by acting selfishly:
1. For any j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, P(R(B j))−P(L(B j))∼ D j.
2. For any u,v ∈ V ′ s.t. there are no unoccupied slots
between them: −d(u,v)< P(u)−P(v)< d(u,v).
Just as in Lemma 5.1, the second condition yields
that if an agent’s goal vertex is vacant, she will occupy
it. Let v ∈ B j be the incoming agent’s goal for some
j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, and let vij be the first vertex in Vj (the one
with minimal index i) such that v is not right of it. We have
that Pr [A matches v to vL] = p
j
L
(
vij
)
. The probability that
the selfish agent will occupy vL is:
Pr [v occupies vL] = Pr [dL+P(vL)< dR+P(vR)]
= Pr [P(vR)−P(vL)> dL−dR]
= Pr [P(vR)−P(vL)> ∆i]
= 1−Pr [P(vR)−P(vL)≤ ∆i]
= 1−F (∆i)
= p jL
(
vij
)
,
where the third equality stems from the fact that ∆i ≥
dL−dR > ∆i−1.
Algorithm 5 A dynamic pricing scheme that makes self-
ish agents simulate algorithm A.
• Let q1 ∼ D1,g2 ∼ D2, . . . ,q` ∼ D`.
• Let L(v) be the set { j ∈ {1, . . . , `} : v is right of B j}.
• ∀v ∈ V ′, set P(v) = c+∑ j∈L(v) q j for some constant
c.
The dynamic pricing scheme given in Algorithm 5
satisfies the conditions for simulating algorithm A. uunionsq
We conclude:
COROLLARY 5.2. Given an estimate of the cost of the
optimal matching by a poly(n) factor, there exists a
payments scheme that gives an O(logn) approximation
to the optimal assignment in weighted line graphs in
expectation.
Proof. Let Z be an estimate, and p be some polyno-
mial such that OPT/p(n) ≤ Z ≤ p(n) ·OPT. First, ap-
ply the metric change using Z′ = Z · p(n) as input. Af-
terwards, use a dynamic pricing scheme that simulates
the harmonic algorithm according to the transformed met-
ric. There exists such a pricing scheme according to The-
orem 5.3. Since Z′ ∈ [OPT, p(n)2OPT], this yields an
O
(
log
(
p(n)2 ·n)) = O(logn) approximation to the opti-
mal assignment in expectation. uunionsq
6 Discussion
Observable History For some arbitrary function h, we
define the h-observable history after event i− 1 to be
h(σ ,s)where σ =σ1, . . . ,σi−1 is the sequence of previous
agent types and s = s1, . . . ,si−1 the sequence of decisions
made thus far.
If for some non-invertible function q we have that
g(σ ,s) = q(g′(σ ,s)), ∀σ ,s,
we say that g hides more than g′.
This suggests a tradeoff between the price of anarchy
of a dynamic posted pricing scheme and the information
available to it.
We remark that the study of h-observable histories
also makes sense for arbitrary online problems, in the con-
text of mechanism design (not restricted to posted prices)
and in the non-strategic setting of online algorithms.
Pricing With posted prices, prices are determined before
the event occurs.
For non-posted price mechanisms — one issue is
“when will the price be determined?” Is the payment
determined promptly (when the agent arrives) or only
later? In [7] this issue came up in the context of an online
Groves mechanism.
Commitment to pricing, Rate of Price Change Obvi-
ous disadvantages of dynamic pricing include (a) prices
are unknown, you plan to go downtown but don’t know
what it will cost you, (b) you may start circling the block
waiting for the prices to change. Thus it would be highly
advantageous to be able to (a) commit to prices in advance
and (b) slow the rate of change.
One interesting model is to have the price function
Pi depend, not on the events σ1, . . . ,σi−1 and decisions
s1, . . . ,si−1, but on a shorter prefix of these sequences.
This has the effect of committing to prices in advance.
A natural question is how does this impact the price of
anarchy?
Simulating Simple Online Algorithms It is not clear if
or how one can convert an arbitrary online algorithm to a
dynamic pricing scheme. The simulation technique that
we’ve repeatedly used above seems to work when the
algorithm is particularly simple. For example, it is not
clear how to give dynamic posted prices with good price
of anarchy for the problem of metrical matching on metric
spaces other than the line. One desirable goal would be
to find alternative online algorithms, possibly with higher
competitive ratios, and try to find pricing schemes that
simulate these algorithms.
Structural Relationships Given an online setting, it is
clear that the following weakly increase:
• The competitive ratio of an online algorithm.
• The price of anarchy achievable by a dominant strat-
egy incentive compatible mechanism, where the true
agent types are revealed.
• The price of anarchy achievable by a dominant
strategy incentive compatible mechanism, when re-
stricted to the current agent type and some h-
observable history of previous agents.
• The price of anarchy achievable by a dynamic pric-
ing scheme restricted to h-observable history.
However, it is not clear if there is any stronger relation that
holds in general. Moreover, these can be further refined,
leading to additional questions, e.g.:
• How does promptness of payment determination im-
pact the price of anarchy of mechanisms?
• Given that a mechanism or pricing schemes uses h-
observable history, how does the price of anarchy
depend on properties of h?
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A Appendix
A.1 An Illustration of the Fractional Traversal Algo-
rithm The following is an example illustrating the exe-
cution of Algorithm 1 given three tasks as input:
Example 1 The fractional traversal algorithm applied
to a metrical task system with states {1,2,3}, distances
d1,2 = 2, d1,3 = 3, d2,3 = 4, and traversal sequence τ =
(1,2,1,3)∗. The example and the underlying metric are
also illustrated.
• Task w1 = (3,6,3):
– λ 11 = 2/3, i.e., process two thirds of task w
1 in
state τ1 = 1, for a work expenditure of 3 ·2/3=
2. Increase j by one.
– λ 12 = 1/3, i.e., process the remaining 1/3 of
task w1 in state τ2 = 2, for a work expenditure
of 6/3 = 2. At this point the algorithm will
increase j by one. Move to state τ3 = 1.
• Task w2 = (1,3,4): λ 23 = 1, for a work expenditure
of 1 in state τ3 = 1, at this point of time ρ j = ρ3 = 1.
• Task w3 = (10,10,10):
– λ 33 = 2/10, for a work expenditure of 2 in state
τ3 = 2. Increase j by one. Move to state τ4 = 3.
– λ 34 = 3/10, for a work expenditure of 3 in state
τ4 = 3. Increase j by one. Move to state τ5 = 1.
– λ 35 = 2/10, for a work expenditure of 2 in state
τ5 = 1. Increase j by one. Move to state τ6 = 2.
– λ 36 = 2/10, for a work expenditure of 2 in state
τ6 = 2. Increase j by one. Move to state τ7 = 1.
– λ 37 = 1/10, for a work expenditure of 1 in state
τ7 = 1, at this point of time ρ7 = 1.
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